A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt by Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto
 
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini. 1990. A positive theory of
fiscal deficits and government debt. Review of Economic Studies
57, no. 3: 403-414.
Published Version doi:10.2307/2298021
Accessed February 18, 2015 12:23:08 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3612769
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAANBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
A POSITIVE THEORY OF FISCAL
DEFICITS AND GOVERNMENT
DEBT IN A DEMOCRACY
Alberto Alesina
Guido Tabellini
Working Paper No. 2308
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
July 1987
The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in Financial
Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2308
July 1987
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Democracy
ABSTRACT
This paper considers an economy in which policyniakerswith different
preferences concerning fiscal policy alternatein office as a result of
democratic elections. It is shown that in this situation governmentdebt
becomes a strategic variable used by each policymakerto influence the choices
of his successors. In particular, if different policymakersdisagree about
the desired composition of government spending betweentwo public goods, the
economy exhibits a deficits bias. Namely,in this economy debt accumulation
is higher than it would be with a social planner. Accordingto the results of
our model, the equilibrium level of governmentdebt is larger: the larger is
the degree of polarization between alternating governments;and the more
likely it is that the current government will notbe reelected. The paper has
empirical implications which may contribute to explainthe current fiscal
policies in the United States and in severalother countries.
Alberto Alesina
Guido Tabellini
GSIA
Department of Economics
Carnegie—Mellon University
UCLA
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Los Angeles, CA 90024
and
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138"This deficit is no despised orphan. It's President
Reagan's child, and secretly, he loves it, as David Stockman
has explained: The deficit rigorously discourages any idea
of spending another dime on social welfare".
New York Times. January 25. 1987.
1.INTRODUCTION
Budget deficits and debt accunimulation can servetwo purposes: they
provide a means of redistributing income over timeand across generations; and
they serve as a means of minimizing the deadweightlosses of taxation
associated with the provision of public goods and services. This paper
focuses on the latter issue. Thus, as in Barro (1979),Brock—Turnovsk.Y (1980)
and Lucas—Stokey (1983), public debt is modeled as a means of distributingtax
distortions over time.
Barro (1985), (1986), (1987) has shown that this normative theoryof
fiscal policy can explain quite well the behavior of public debtin the United
States and in the United Kingdom. However, this theory maynot provide a
complete explanation of two recent facts: a) the rapidaccumulation of
government debt in several industrialized countries includingthe United
States, in relatively peaceful times; b) the large variationin the debt
policies pursued by different countries with similareconomic conditions.
This paper attempts to explain these facts by remQving the assumption
that fiscal policy is set by a benevolent social planner whomaximizes the
welfare of a representative consumer. We consider an economywith two
policymakers who randomly alternate in office and pursuedifferent
objectives. Different policymakers exist because the private agentshave
different views about fiscal policy and vote for their preferred
policymaker. Thus we focus on a positive rather than anormative theory of
fiscal policy.'
The crucial point emphasized in this paper is that in thissituation
public debt is used strategically by each government toinfluence the choices
of its successors. Thus, the time path of public debt is theresult of the
strategic interaction of different governments which arein office in
different periods. This leads to fiscal policies which differ sharplyfromthose which would be chosen by a social planner, certainof her future
reappointment.2
The main features of our mode) can be summarizedas follows: there is a
constant population of individuals with the same timehorizon, acting as
consumers, workers and voters. They are identical in all respectsexcept in
their preferences about two public goods, suppliedby the government and
financed by means of distortionary taxes on labor. Differentindividuals have
different preferences on the composition of publicconsumption. The
policymaker is appointed at discrete intervals by means of democratic
elections, and is chosen among two candidates (or "politicalparties"). Each
party maximizes the utility function of a differentgroup of consumers (its
"constituency"). Alternatively, one may interpret the disagreement between
the policymakers in terms of different "ideological" viewsabout social
welfare.
This paper shows that the equilibrium stock of debt tendsto be larger
than with a benevolent social planner certain of her futurereappointment.
Intuitively, disagreement among alternating governments anduncertainty about
the elections' outcome prevent the party in office fromfully internalizing
the cost of leaving debt to its successors. Thissuggests the possible
existence of a deficit bias in democracies (or withany other form of
government where alternation between different policymakers ispossible).
More generally, our paper suggests that differences inpolitical institutions
can contribute to explain the variance in the debt policiespursued by
different countries or by the same country at differentpoints in time.
According to the results of our model, the equilibrium level of public debt
tends to be larger: (i) the larger is the degree ofpolarization between
alternating governments; (ii) the more likely it is that the current
government will not be reappointed; (iii) the more likely it is that the
government is constrained to provide at least a minimum level of each kind of
public good. These implications of the modelare, in principle, empirically
testable.
The outline of the paper is as follows: the model ispresented in Section
2. Section 3 analyzes its static properties. Theoptimal and time consistent
fiscal policies of an hypothetical social plannerare described in section
4. Sections 5 and 6 characterize the dynamic economicand political
equilibrium in a two period version of the model. Sections 7 and 8extend the
2basic model by considering its infinite horizon version and more general
specifications of the policymakers' objective functions and constraints.The
conclusions and the normative implications of our analysis are summarized in
the final section.
2. THE MODEL
The model is derived from Lucas—Stokey (1983). There is a constant
population of 14 individuals, acting as consumers, workers and voters. All of
them are born at the beginning of period zero and have the same time
horizon. We consider both the finite horizon case (two periods) and the
infinite horizon case. Consumer i has the following separable objective
function, wi:
=
E0fz 6t[u(c)+v(x?)+a. h(gt)+(1_a.)h(ft)]}; Ps>O; (1)
t=0
•1 1
wherec is private consumption; x is leisure time; g and f are two different
public goods in per capita terms; and .5isthe discount factor. The functions
u(.), v(.) and h(-) are continuous, at least three times continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. E0 is the
expectation operator conditional on the information set available at time 0.
Each consumer is identified only by her preference on the two public goods;
this difference is parameterized by the coefficient Note that a1isnot
constrained to lie in the interval [0,11. Some consumers may attribute
negative utility to certain types of public goods, such as military
expenditure.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor that can be transformed
with a linear technology into one unit of non—storable output. The government
can tax the consumers by means of a proportional tax on labor income The
tax rate is constrained to be identical across consumers.
Thus, the intertemporal budget constraint faced by each consumer is:
T T
c ￿b+z (1—t )(1—x ) (2)
t .'t=o
t
where is the present value at time zero of one unit of output at time t,
i.e. j= h whereq is the inverse of the gross interest ratein period
3I and =1;b0 is the amount of government debt held by the consumer at the
beginning of period zero. For simplicity throughout thepaper we assume
With identical tax rates for allconsumers, the superscript i on c and
x can be dropped since all the consumers make the same choicesof consumption
and leisure.
The goverrinlent can at no cost transform theoutput produced by the
private sector in the two nonstorable public goods,g and f. Thus, in each
period the government chooses the level and the composition ofpublic
consumption, the tax rate and the amount of borrowing (lending) from the
consumers. For simplicity, we assume that the government can issueonly fixed
interest debt with one period maturity. Thisassumption prevents each
government from manipulating the term structure of public debt in order to
bind its successors, as in Lucas—Stokey (1983). We alsoassume no default
risk: each government is committed to honoring the debtobligations of its
predecessors.4 Under the final hypothesis that theeconomy is closed to the
rest of the world, the resource constraint (inper—capita terms) is given by:
ct +xt+g÷ t ￿1; t:O,1...T. (3)
In this economy there are two "political parties", denoted 0and R, which
can hold office. The parties are the political representatives of different
"pressure groups", i.e. of the different (groups of) consumers. Since all
consumers make identical choices regarding consumption and leisure, the
parties "care" identically about these variables, but they have different
preferences about the composition of public consumption. Theirpreferences
are as follows (the superscripts identify the party):
T
= t
[u(c)+v(x)+h(g)IJ; (4) t=o
= E0fz
[u(ct)+v(xt)+h(ft)]}. (5)
Thus, party 0 is identified with the consumer (or "constituency") witha1 =
andparty R is identified with the consumer (or "constituency") witha1 =
0.This assumption greatly simplifies the algebra. Themore general case
4with arbitrary values offor the two parties will be analyzed in Section 8.
We assume that the preferences of party 0 and R do not change over time and
that a prohibitive barrier prevents the entry of a third party.
Elections are held at the beginning of each period. A 'period" is thus
defined as a term of office. The electoral results are uncertain: party D is
elected with probability P and party R with probability 1—P. For expositional
purposes P is temporarily assumed to be an exogenous constant: in Sections 6
and 7 we complete the model with a political equilibrium in which every
consumer/voter rationally votes for her most preferred party.
The private sector is atomistic. Thus the "representative consumer"
solves (2) and (3)Jtaking tt. g and f as given. Since tt is the same for
every consumer, the solution of this problem is characterized by:
uc(ct)(l_it) =v(x) (6)
ctuc(ct) =o
E I.Jc(ct+i) (7)
where uc and v, denote the derivative of u(.) and v(.) with respect to their
arguments (the arguments of the functions u(.) and v(.) will be omitted when
there is no possibility of confusion). In (7), the expectation reflects the
uncertainty of consumers about the future tax policy due to their uncertainty
about the identity of future governments.
3. TAXES AND PUBLIC SPENDING FOR A GIVEN DEFICIT
A crucial assumption of this paper is that a government cannot bind the
taxation and expenditure policies of its successors; this is true whether the
successor belongs to the same or to the opponent party. The only way in which
the fiscal policy of the current administration can influence the actions of
its successors is through the law of motion of public debt. Since here the
optimal fiscal policy can be time inconsistent, the model is solved by means
of dynamic programming. The solution is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
game in which each government plays against its successors and "against" the
private sector. It is convenient to separate the government's optimization
problem into two stages: the intraperiod problem of choosing taxes and public
5consumption for a given fiscal deficit; and the intertemporal problem. of
choosing the size of the deficit. Since the government objective function is
time—separable, this separation into two stages simplifies the exposition but
involves no loss of generality.
Each government maximizes its own objective function, either (4) or (5),
under the constraints given by (3), (6) and (7). Inspection of the two
parties' objective functions and of their constraints easily yields the
following results:i) in any period, only one kind of public good is
produced: party D supplies only g and party R only f.5 ii) For a given fiscal
deficit, both parties choose the same tax rate and the same level of public
consumption, although on different goods; thus private consumption and
leisure are identical under either party. For a given deficit, the two
parties differ only with respect to the desired composition of the public
goods.
These two results, together with the resource constraint (3), enable us
to rewrite the static optimization problem faced by the party in office as:
Max u(ct) + V(xt) + h(1_ct_xt) (8)
ct xt
subject to:
H(bt+i. bt. xt):(ct_bt)uc(ct)+ 6 Et uc(ct+i)bt÷i_(l_xt)vx(xt) ￿ 0.(9)
This problem is solved for given values of the debt at the beginning and end
of period t, namely bt and bt+i. Equation (9) has been obtained by
substituting (6) and (7) into (2) to eliminate rt.It represents the
government budget constraint, as a function of ct, Xt, bt and bt+i. Needless
to say, the government does not choose x and c directly: it chooses taxes and
public spending, affecting x and c indirectly. Throughout the paper we will
assume that the government's optimum is an interior point of its feasible
set. The necessary first order conditions (if, say, party D is in office)
imply:
Hx(hg_uc) =Hc(hg_Vx) (10)
where H denotes the derivative of H with respect to the variable i. Through—
6out the rest of the paper we assume that the second order conditions of this
problem, reported in Section 1 of the Appendix, are satisfied.
The first order conditions, namely equation (10) together with the
constraints (3) and (9), implicitly define the optimal private and public
consumption and leisure choices in period t as a function of bt and bt+i;
c*(bt, bt÷i), x*(bt, bt+i), g*(b, bt÷i), f*(bt, bt÷i).
Note that, recalling point (ii) on page 7, we have g*(b, bt+i) =f*(bt,bt+i)
for any bt, bt+i. With virtually no loss of generality we shall assume for
the rest of the paper that at the optimum the labor supply function is upward
sloping.6
In Section 2 of the Appendix several useful results regarding the partial
derivatives of c*, x, g* and f* are established. For example it is shown
that c* and x are increasing in bt. The intuition is that if bt increases
more interests have to be paid in period t. With a given end of period debt
(bt+i). the government is forced to reduce public consumption and to raise
taxes. The private sector's response to the higher tax rates and to the
larger initial public debt is to increase its consumption of both leisure and
output.
The solution of this static optimization problem defines the indirect
utility of both parties in period t as a function of the debt at the beginning
and at the end of the period. Let us indicate this function for the party in
office as Re(b, bt+i). This function is identical for both parties (since
g* =f*and both parties choose the same tax rate). Section 2 of the appendix
proves the following:
Lema 1
____ iscontinuous and differentiable, strictly decreasing in bt
and strictly concave in both bt and bt÷i.
Thus, not surprisingly, the party in office gets disutility by inheriting
debt from the past. The utility function of either party whenever it does
not hold office can also be easily characterized. Specifically, letting
RN(bt, bt+i) denote the utility function of either party if not elected in
period t, we have:
7RN(bt, bt+i) =u(c*(bt,bt÷i) +v(x*(bt,bt+i)) =
= Re(b,bt+i) -h(g*(bt,bt+i)) (11)
It is shown in Section 2 of the Appendix that RN(.) is continuous and
differentiable and it is strictly increasing in bt. Thus, the party out of
office benefits from the debt inherited from the past, since it makes the
private sector wealthier in the current period.
4. FISCAL POLICY UNDER A SOCIAL PLANNER
In this section we characterize the solution of the intertemporal problem
faced by an hypothetical social planner. This solution will serve as a
benchmark to characterize the effects of the elections.
A social planner has two characteristics: a) she does not face elections,
thus she is "reappointed' with probability 1 each period; b) she adopts as her
preferences a weighted average of the preference of the citizens, (i.e. of
equation (1)).
For expositional purposes, let us consider the effects of these two
characteristics separately, starting with a). Thus we consider the case of a
policymaker, say party D, that is certain of being reappointed each period.
It is easy to verify that the optimal policy would always balance the budget,
as in Lucas—Stokey (1983). However, since we rule out the possibility of
making binding commitments, we are interested in the time-consistent fiscal
policy, which may or may not coincide with the optimal policy. In the
infinite horizon case, the social planner faces the following problem of
dynamic programming:
Ve(b) =Max{Re(b, bt÷i) +6Ve(b+l)} (12)
The first order conditions are:
R(bt, bt+i) +6V(bt+i)
=0 (13)
8V(bt) =R!(bt,bt+i)
(14)
where R?(.) 1: 1, 2, denotes the partial derivative of Re(.) with respect to
its ith argument. From (13) and (14) it follows that in the steady state
(i.e., for bt =bt+i
=b)we obtain:
R(b, b) +oR(b,
b) =o (15)
Substituting the expressions far R(.) and R?(.) derived in section 3 of the
Appendix, equation (15) simplifies to:
(h _uc) *
6Uc1 b=O (16)
Since generically 4t 0,equation (16) can be satisfied if and only if b =0;
that is, if and only if in the steady state the government issues no debt.
Thus, by using a simplified version of the proof given in Section 5 of the
Appendix, we can prove the following result:
Proposition 1
The steady state level of government debt is zero and it is locally
stable.
Thus, the optimal and time consistent policy coincide: the social planner
would never issue public debt.7 A slight generalization of these arguments
shows that analogous results hold for the finite horizon case.
We now turn to the problem of choosing the optimal composition of public
expenditures. A social planner would choose a point on the "Pareto frontier"
of the economy. Thus, she would maximize a weighted average of the utility
functions of the citizens, namely:
N .
w'= w' =6tLu(c)+v(x)+h(g)+(1a)h(f)1 (17)
1=1 t=O
N N
where a= zX.a1 and are arbitrary weights such that E
11
=1.
1=1
• i=1
9Obviously every point of the Pareto frontier is associated with a different
choice of weights. It is easy to show that Proposition 1 applies identically
to this case. Furthermore, the optimal composition of public expenditures
satisfies the following condition:
=(l-a)hf (18)
Thus, the social planner equates the social marginal utility of the two types
of public good. The optimal composition of the two goods depends on the
choice of weights, &.
5.ALTERNATING GOVERNMENTS IN THE NO PERIOD MODEL
To provide the basic intuition, we consider here the simplest possible
case, with a time horizon of two periods. This case greatly simplifies the
analysis by eliminating the private sector's uncertainty about the future tax
policy. Consider the last period of the game: here both parties must collect
the same tax revenue, since they inherit the same initial debt and are forced
to leave the same end of period debt, namely 0. Thus, in the first period
(labeled period 0) consumers face no uncertainty about the tax rate of period
1.It follows that the interest rate is independent of the electoral outcome
and of P. This in turn implies that the functions Re(.) and RN(.) defined in
Section 3 are also independent of P.
Suppose that party U holds office at the beginning of the first period.
The amount of debt that this party chooses to leave to the following period
(b1) can be found by solving the following problem:
Max V(b0) =Re(b0,b1)
+s[PRe(b1,O) +(1_P)RN(b1,O)] (19)
Given that b0 =0,the first order condition can be written as:
R(O, b1) =— 6[P
R!(bi, O)÷(l-P)R(b1,O)] (20)
The left hand side of (20) can be interpreted as the marginal utility in
10period 0 of leaving debt to the future. We denote it by MV. The righthand
side can be interpreted as the expected marginal cost of inheriting debt
tomorrow, discounted to the present by 6.Moreprecisely, it is the negative
of the discounted expected marginal disutility of next period debt.It is
denoted by MC. Equation (20) implies that at the optimum MV =MC.This
necessary condition is reproduced graphically in Figure1. MV is drawn with a
negative slope since Re(.) is strictly concave (see !.emma 1). MCis drawn as
an upward sloping curve. This need not be the case, sinceRN(.) is not
necessarily concave. However, the slope of MC must always be greater thanthe
slope of MV, since otherwise the second order conditions would be violated.
Intuitively, consider a small movement from b1 in Figure 1 to b1 +eC> 0
and "small".If at (b1+c) we have MV >MC,then b1 can not be an optimum,
since a movement away from b1 increases total utility. Hence, MC must always
intersect MV from below.
Equation (20), and the corresponding Figure 1, implicitly define the
optimal end of period debt, 5 as a function of P. We are interested in
characterizing this functional relationship:
Proposition 2
is a strictly decreasing function of P. for any value of P in the
interval 10,1].
Proof: The partial derivative of MV with respect to P is zero, since, as
shown above, neither Re(.) nor RN(.) depend on P. By the same argument, and
using (9), we have:
ic.= —o(R(51,0) —R,(b1,
0)) =—& h'g(51, 0). (21)
In (21) g is the derivative of g* respect to its first argument, b1. Lemma
2.1 in Appendix has established that g c 0. Thus, an increase in P shifts
the MC curve upwards, say to the dotted curve of Figure 1. Since MC always
intersects MV from below, this implies that b1 must fall with the increase of
P.
Q.E.0.
The proof of this result is also suggestive of the intuition. The costs
11I....
•et
•.0"
S...of leaving debt to the future arise from two sources: the tax distortions
associated with the higher taxes tomorrow, and the reduced public consumption
of tomorrow. However, the second cost only arises if the party currently in
office is reappointed next period and it can choose the desired public good.
Thus, the larger is the probability of being reelected, the more the party in
office internalizes the cost of leaving debt to the future (i.e., the higher
is MC). As a result, the larger is the probability of being reelected, the
smaller is the debt left by each government to its successor. In more
colorful terms, by leaving debt to the future, today's government can force
its successor to "pay the bills" and spend less on the public good that is
worthless for today's government.
Thus, Proposition 2 implies that the level of debt left to the last
period (bi) is larger in a democracy then with a social planner; namely the
social planner would choose to balance the budget in both periods, while
either one of the two parties chooses to run a budget deficit in the first
period leaving a positive amount of debt to be repaid in the last period. In
this sense the electoral uncertainty creates a sub—optimal deficit bias. This
bias is stronger for the party with the smaller probability of reappointment.
6. POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we analyze voting behavior. Consider the elections held
at the beginning of period 1, and assume that, say, party 0 is in office in
period zero. Each voter votes for the party that is expected to deliver the
highest utility in period 1. Thus voter i votes for party 0 if and only if
the expected utility with D elected is not lower than the expected utility if
R is elected. Since both parties choose the same tax rate in period 1,
consumption and leisure are the same in period 1 regardless of the electoral
outcome. Thus voter i votes for party 0 if and only if:8
(aih(g(O, b1)) -(ic1i)h(f*(O,b1)] =h(gt(O,bi))(2ai -1)￿0 {22)
In deriving the right hand side of (22) we used the fact that g*(O, b1) =
f*(0,b1). Since h(g*(b1)) >0,condition (22) is equivalent to￿
Letus assume that there is uncertainty about the distribution of voters
13preferences, namely about the distribution of the parametersa.j across
consumers. In particular the preferences of the median voter are not known
with certainty.9 Given a known distribution over the preferences of the
median voter and given (22) it follows that the probability thatparty U will
be elected is given by:
P =[prob.am ￿ (23)
where am is the value of a corresponding to the median voter. From (23) it is
apparent that P is a constant from the point of view of period zero. In
particular, P is not a function of b1. Again, this result is due to the fact
that, for any given level of debt inherited from period 0, both parties choose
the same level of taxes and public expenditure (although on differentgoods)
in period 1.
Note that the results implying policy convergence do not apply to this
model. Since binding commitments are not available, and the horizon is
finite, both parties can only credibly announce to the voters the time—
consistent fiscal policy characterized in the preceding sections. For
example, party 0 cannot convince the voters that if elected in period 1 it
would supply a positive amount of f. Such an announcement would not be
believed, because the voters know that the only time consistent policy for
party D is to set f =0if elected; in fact the voters know that party U
maximizes the objective function (4) when in office. This argument is
developed more in detail in Alesina (1986 and 1987).
Thus, we have shown that the equilibrium of Section 3 is unique and
represents a time—consistent politico—economic equilibrium based on fully
rational behavior of consumers/voters. Using propositions 1 and 2, we arenow
ready to summarize the results obtained so far in the following:
Proposition 3
A democracy in which citizens disagree about the composition of public
expenditures exhibits higher deficits and debt accumulation than an economy
with a social planner who is appointed for ever.
147. THEINFINITEHORIZON CASE
In the finite horizon case, debt in the final period of the game has to
be repaid in full. In this section we show that our results generalize to the
infinite horizon case, in which the debt need not be fully retired. In order
to avoid the multiplicity of equilibria that inevitably arises in infinite
horizon dynamic games, we restrict each government to selecting strategies
contingent only on the stock of debt outstanding at the beginning of its term
of office. This implies that we do not explore the reputational equilibria
which may exist. We can characterize the solution only in the
neighborhood of P = a particular case that greatly simplifies the
analysis. If P = the optimization problem faced by the two parties is
identical. Thus, the fiscal deficit, the tax rate and the level of public
expenditure is the same for both parties: the only difference across parties
is about which public good is supplied. As in the two period case, this fact
eliminates consumers' uncertainties about future taxes so that Re(.) and
are independent of P. Intuitively the basic results should extend to any
value of P, however the formal proof for the general case is much harder to
establish.
We proceed assuming P exogenous and then show that there exists a
rational electoral equilibrium compatible with this assumption. The dynamic
programming problem solved by the party in office is:
ve(b) =Max{Re(b, bt+i) +opVe(b+l)+o(1_P)VN(bt+l)} (24)
bt+i
where Ve(.) and VN(.) are the value functions of the party if elected and if
non-elected respectively. Thus:
vN(bt) =RN(bt,bt+i) +8(pVe(b+l)
+(1_P)VN(bt+l)) (25)
The first order conditions are:
R(bt, bt+i) =_6[PV(bt÷i)
+(1_P)V(bt+i)J. (26)
Equation (26) has exactly the same interpretation of (20) in Section 5: the
left hand side of (26) represents the marginal utility of leaving debt to the
15future (MV); the right hand side is the expected marginal cost of inheriting
debt tomorrow (MC). Thus, the diagram of Figure 1 still applies identically.
MV is downward sloping since Re(.) is concave. MC can be eitherupward
sloping or downward sloping (since vN(bt ) is not necessarily concave), but
has to intersect MV from below for (26) to characterize an interior
optimum.'° From (26) we obtain:
Proposition 4
In a neighborhood of P = the steady state level of public debt is
always positive and locally stable if the sufficient condition c.2 of Lemma
2.1 in Section 2 of the Appendix is satisfied.
Proof: See Section 4 of the Appendix.
The condition alluded in the text is needed to insure that the total
derivative of the level of the steady state debt on public expenditure is
negative. Intuitively, an increase in the steady state level of debt requires
an increase in the flow of interest payment to the private sector. To finance
this interest flow the government is forced in general, to both tax more and
spend less on public goods.
Thus, as in the two—period model, alternating governments which disagree
over the composition of public consumption have a tendency to issue more
public debt than the social planner. The intuition is still as in the
previous section: since governments are not certain of winning the election
they do not fully internalize the costs of leaving debt to their successors.
In the two period model, these costs take the form of higher taxes and lower
public consumption in order to repay the debt in the final period of the
game. Here, instead, these costs correspond to the payment of interest on the
stock of debt outstanding."
As in the previous section, we can ask what are the consequences on
public debt of changing the probability of electoral outcomes. A local answer
is given by the following result:
16Proposition 5
rn a neighborhood of P = under the same condition of Proposition 4,
and the additional sufficient condition:
H￿OandVe_VN so
bt÷i bb bb
the stock of public debt issued by either party in the steady state is a
decreasing function of the probability of that party winning the elections.
The proof is contained in Section 5 of the Appendix.12
The intuition is the same as for the previous results. If P rises, the
party in office internalizes more of the costs of issuing debt; thus its
policy is to reduce the stock of debt outstanding. This result reinforces the
positive implications of the model, already discussed in Section 4: the debt
policy of the party in office is influenced by its probability of winning the
elections. The lower is this probability, the larger is the stock of debt
issued in equilibrium and in the steady state by this party.13
We finally show that there exists a political equilibrium which implies a
constant P = At the beginning of period t, voter i votes for party D if
and only if her lifetime utility is greater if in period t D is elected rather
than R. Suppose that both parties choose the same tax rate and the same level
of public consumptionjin period t (even though they choose public goods of
different kinds) so that they run the same deficit and leave the same amount
of debt to the future. In this case the voters' expected utility from period
ti-i to infinity is independent of which party is elected in period t. As a
result, under this assumption, the voter's behavior is as described in the
previous section: voter i votes for party 0 if and only if i ￿ as in
Section 6. Like in that section, the probability that party D be elected in
period t is then:
P =
prob(czm￿ (27)
Finally, assume that the distribution over the possible value of am is such
that:
prob(am > (28)
17If (28) holds, then P = but in this case we showed that the time
consistent policy for both parties is indeed to set the same tax rate and the
same level of public consumption, although on different goods. Thus, we can
conclude that there exists a distribution of the median voter's preferences
supporting the economic equilibrium described in propositions 4 and 5 as a
rational political equilibrium.
8. EXTENSIONS
In this section we extend the results presented above in several
directions. First of all we generalize the objective functions of the two
parties to:
T
=z (29)
t =0
I
= (30)
t=0
for any value of l>a>O. In this case both parties assign positive utility to
both public goods, although with different weights. Note that if a >1the
results obtained with a=l are strengthened since party 0(R) attributes
negative utility to good f(g): thus neither party ever would supply a positive
amount of this good (an analogous argument holds for a <0).To fix ideas,
throughout this section we consider l>a>½; thus party 0(R) attributes more
value to good g(f) (the alternative case is completely symmetric). The
coefficient a parameterizes the extent of the disagreement: the farther a is
fromthe larger the disagreement.
The second extension of the model is that we allow for downward rigidity
in the level of public consumption. We assume that a minimum level of both
public goods must be provided. Thus we impose;
f￿ kand g￿ k (31)
These constraints may reflect institutional or technological factors limiting
the flexibility of the government in solving its problem. For example, a
18minimum level of defense spending might have to be provided or thelevel of
social security cannot be reduced below a certain minimum. The caseof
different minimum levels of public consumption in the two goods complicates
the algebra without qualitatively changing the results.
We rule out as uninteresting the case in which both constraintsin (31)
are binding. Then, the optimal composition of public consumptionfor, say,
party 0 is determined by the following first orderconditions:
￿(1—a)h
(32)
The first order condition for party R is analogous to (32), except that ais
replaced by (1-a). Condition (32) holds with a strict inequalityif and only
if the constraint is binding. Thus, if the constraint is not binding,the
government equates the marginal utility of the two kinds of public goods.
The symmetry of this procedure suggests three simplifications whichhold
in the two period case and in the infinite horizon for P = i) The two
parties supply the same amount of the good they prefer andof the less
preferred one (the superscript indicate which party suppliesthe good):
gD =fR;gR =f0;gD >fD• (33)
ii) The tax rate and the size of the fiscal deficit chosen bythe two parties
is identical. iii) The constraint in (31) is binding for party Dif and only
if it is also binding for party R.
It follows that the first order conditions of the static problem of the
government are analogous to those stated in Section 3, andthat Lemmas 1 and
2.1 (in Appendix) still apply identically. In particular, the difference
between party D's utility if elected and if not elected can be expressed,
using (33) as:
Re(b, bt+i) —RN(bt,bt+i) =(2a—l)(h(g0)—h(f0)) (34)
which is positive by (33). The expression of (Re_RN) for party R is
symmetric.
We now turn to the characterization of the dynamic equilibrium in the two
period model. The extension to the infinite horizon for P =is
19straightforward and yields analogous results. The equilibrium is still
characterized by the condition that the marginal utility ofleaving debt to
the future (MV) is equal to the marginal cost ofinheriting debt from the past
(MC)— -see(20) and Figure 1. Moreover, MV is still as in Section 5.
However,the relationship between MC and P now depends on whetheror not the
constraints stated in (31) are binding in the final period of thegame. If
these constraints are binding, then using (34) andassuming that party D is in
office in period 0, we have:
aMC e N D =(R1,
—
R1)
=— ó(2al)hgg1 >0 (35)
The results of Section 5 apply here: a decrease in theprobability of being
elected shifts MC to the right and thereby increases the debt issued inthe
first period. Uncertainty about the outcome of the electiongenerates a
deficit bias, as in the previous sections. Furthermore, note from(35) that
the higher is a,thehigher is the effect of P on the level of debt. Hence,
for a given P <1,the larger is the disagreement, the larger is the deficit.
If instead the constraints in (31) are not binding, thenwe have:
c.- 6(R-R)
=
-6(2a-l)(hgg -hff)O (36)
Thus, for P <1,party 0 would still choose not to balance the budget in
period 0 (except in the particular case in which the right hand side of (36)
happens to be 0). In this sense, the debt policy of the party in office
differs from that of the social planner. However thegovernment may now issue
more or less debt than the social planner depending upon the sign of (36). In
particular if <0then we have a surplus bias, rather then a deficit
bias. It can be shown that the sign of the inequality (36) dependsupon the
value of the third derivative of the function h(.)J4 The intuition isas
follows. If the constraints in (31) are not binding, then ahigher public
debt inherited from the past results in a reduction ofexpenditures on both
public goods: g <0and f9 <0.Hence, each government internalizes the
cost of leaving debt to its successors, whether or not itexpects to be
reelected. If If?I >IgI,then the party in office (here D) reduces the
non—preferred public good (f) by more than the preferred one (g) as initial
debt increases. In this case, the marginal disutility of debt ishigher if
20non—elected than if elected: —R
<0.As a result, in equilibrium the
government runs a surplus rather than a deficit.
Consider the situation in which the constraint in (31) is just binding
for, say, party D:
cshg(90) =(1—cz)hf(k) (37)
Equation (37) defines the threshold value of k such that (31) is just
binding. The implicit function theorem applied to (37) establishes that such
value of k is a decreasing function of a. The same result applies to party
R. It follows that the higher is a, the more likely it is that the
constraints in (37) are binding, and hence that a deficit bias results in
equilibrium. Conversely, for a given a, the larger is the minimum level of
public goods (k) that has to be supplied, the more likely it is that the
constraints in (37) are binding. Hence, the higher is k, the more likely it
is that the party in office in the first period runs a fiscal deficit.
These results can be generalized to a stochastic setting in which each
government is uncertain about the level of the constraint faced by its
successors. Consider, for example, a situation in which k is expected to rise
in the future, so that future governments are perceived as very likely to be
constrained. This may generate an incentive for the party currently in office
to run a deficit, since future governments are likely to be prevented from
repaying the deficit by reducing the public good that they value less (and
that today's government values more). This contrasts with the optimal fiscal
policy: as Lucas and Stokey (1983) have shown, the optimal policy here would
be to run a surplus, not a deficit, so as to smooth the tax distortions over
time in anticipation of the larger future public expenditures.
We can summarize the foregoing discussion in the following:
Proposition 6
The greater is the degree of polarization between the two parties, a,the
more the fiscal policy chosen by the two parties differs from that chosen by
the social planner. Moreover, the greater the polarization, the more likely
it is that the equilibrium exhibits a deficit bias.
21CONCUJSIOHS
This paper shows how budget deficits and government debt can be used by
each policymaker to influence the fiscal policy chosen by its successors. In
this context, public debt becomes a strategic variable which links today's
government to its successors.
If there is disagreement between political parties this strategic
interaction generates a sub—optimal path of government debt. In particular,
if the citizens disagree about the desired composition of public consumption,
then, in general, the government has a tendency to overissue public debt
relative to the case of full agreement or to the case in which future
reappointment of the current government is certain. This tendency is stronger
the greater is the degree of political polarization and of downward rigidity
in public spending.
From a positive point of view, these results provide new insights on how
to explain the current behavior of fiscal deficits in the United States and
the difference in various countries' experience. In the United States the
current administration has shown rather different views about the desired
composition of government spending relative to the past and (presumably)
relative to future administrations. This paper shows that in this case it is
perfectly rational for the current administration to incur into deficits and
debt accumulation to a much larger extent than previous administrations. An
analogous result has been independently obtained in a very insightful paper by
Persson and Svennson (1q86). They consider the case of two policymakers with
different views about the level rather than the composition of government
expenditure. They show that the "conservative" policymaker (i.e. the one
which likes less public expenditure) chooses to leave deficits in order to
force its "liberal" successor to spend less. Conversely, the "liberal"
policymaker would leave a surplus to its conservative successors. In
addition, according to our results, different countries' experiences can be
related to differences in the degree of political polarization, in the
political stability, and in the flexibility of the government decision process
concerning public consumption. More generally, this paper shows that fiscal
deficits are the aggregate outcome of the political conflict between different
groups of citizens. In this respect the positive predictions of our model
coincide with those of some political science and sociological literature (for
22instance Lindberg and Mayer (1984) and the references quoted therein).
However, the methods of our analysis and our explanation differ sharply from
those of that line of research.
23APPENDIX
1. Second order sufficient conditions
a) Static Optimum Problem: The second order sufficient conditions imply that
the Hessian of the Lagrangian function corresponding to problem (8) is
negative definite. They are, in addition to the strict concavity of u(.),
v(.), and h (.):
= Hs 0; (A.1) xx
2aM=
Hc (A.2)
where H(•) is defined in (9).
b) Dynamic Optimum Problem: The conditions are that H(•) is quasiconcave
with respect to all of its arguments. In addition to (A.1) and (A.2), we need
the following sufficient conditions:
2
a =
Fib b (A.3)
abt+i t÷1 t+1
2(u)2 —ucuccc
0 (A.4)
H +2UcHxx(ct_bt) S 0 (A.5)
Throughout the paper it is assumed that (A.1) —(A.5)always hold.
2. Lemma 2.1
* * (i)g1 <0and >0if:
uc +ucc(ct —bt)￿ 0 (c.1)
24(ii) 4>0 and g(b, b) ÷g(b, b) CO for b ￿0if: (c.1) holds and if:
h
Hxx(•hg_Uc)+VxxHc +UccHx(hg_Vx)/Uc
gg H—H
I (c.)
x C
Proof: We apply the implicit function theorem to the following two equations8
reproduced from the text:
H(.)E(c_b)u(c) +auc(ct+i)bt+i —(l_xt)v
=0 (9)
H(hg•U) —Hc(hg_Vx)
=0 (10)
*
*ac *ac
Letc1 = C2
=bt
,6= , andso on. Then, by applying the
c
act
implicit function theorem we obtain:
rG}1[Gb
* -I I I (A.6)
L HxJLHti
611[Gbi
Lx2 L H Hx_j LHt+li
Solving(A.6) and (A.7), and letting A= GxHx_GxHcwe obtain:
4= - (HxGb —NbGx)IA (A.8)
4= — (GHb -6bH)/A (A.9)
4= GHb1/A
(A.10)
4= — GcHbtl/A çA.11)
25Using the fact that g =—(4+4), weobtain:
=
[Gbt(hx_Hc)
+
Hbt(Gc_Gx)]/A
(A.12)
g =
[Hbtl(Gc_Gx)]/A
(A.13)
+g
=
[Gbt(Hx_Hc)1(Gc_Gx)(Hbt+Hbtl)]/A
(A.14)
Some algebra establishes that:
=
_(Ucc+hgg)Hx
+
hggHc
+
(Vx_hg)Hcc (A.15)
Cx =— (Uc_hg)Hxx—
hggHx
+
(Vxx+hgg)Hc (A.16)
Gb =Ucc(hg_Vx) (A.17)
=(Ct_bt)Ucc+Uc (A.18)
=_(l_Xt)Vxx+ (A.19)
Hb =—u (A.20)
Hb1 =6Uc(Ct+1) + sbt+iucc(Ct+i)4(bt+i, bt+2) (A.21)
We now use the sufficient conditions reported in Section 1 of the Appendix to
sign these expressions. By using (A.1) and after some algebra, it can be
shown that A> 0.Rewrite Cc as:
Gc =
— + hgg(Hc_Hx)—
(hg_Vx)Hcc (A.22)
By manipulation of (10) and (6), it can be shown that Hc_Hx c 0. Using (A.1)
it follows that Gc >0.Consider (Gc—Gx):
Cc_Cf — (A.23)
From (10), the sign of (hg—uc) is the same as the sign of Hc=Uc +ucc(ct_t)t).
26The sign is positive if c>1 in Lemma 2.1 holds. Hence, Gc_Gx >0.We then have
gcO. To show that 4 >0,rewrite the numerator of 4 as:
GbHc —
GCHbt
=
Uchgg(Hc_Hx)
-
UcuccHx
-
uc(hg_vx)Hcc
+
ucc(hg—vx)Hc(A.24)
The first two terms on the right hand side of (A.24) are positive. The last
two terms can be rewritten as:
(hg—vx)[— Ucc(Uc+Ucc(Ct_bt))+(Ct_bt)(2(Ucc)2 —ucuccc)] (A.25)
By (c.1) and (A.4), the expression inside the square brackets of (A.25) is
non—negative. Hence,}the right hand side of (A.24) is positive, which in turn
implies 4 >0.In order to show that 4 >0,consider the numerator of 4
in (A.8):
HbGX —
HxGbt
=
—ucl(hg—uc)Hxx+vxxuc+hgg(Hc_Hx)]_Hxucc(hg-vx) (A.26)
By (c.2), the right hand side of (A.26) is positive. Hence 4 >0.Note
that, as emphasized in footnote 6, condition c.1 holds if and only if the
labor supply function is upward sloping.
Finally, recalling the previous discussion, in order to prove that g =
cO inthe steady state, we have to show only that Hb +Hb ￿ 0 if
t t+1
bt=bt+i=bt+2. From (A.20) and (A.21) it follows:
Hb+Hb1 =_Uc(Ct)+óUc(ct+i)+ 6bt+iucc(ct+i)4(bt+i, bt+2) (A.27)
If bt =bt+i
=bt+2.then 4 =4+i; thus(A.27) simplifies to:
Hb + Hb
=— (l_6)Uc+ sbt+iucc4 (A.28)
which is negative if 4 >0and bt+i 0.
Q.E.D.
3. Proof of Lemma 1
Continuity of Re(.) follows from the fact that the maximization is
27performed on a compact feasible set, and from the continuity of u(•), v(•) and
h(•) (see the theorem of the maximum in Hildenbrand (1974)). Differentiability
follows from the fact that c*, x and g* are continuously differentiable, as
implied by the application of the implicit function theorem to (10). Strict
concavity can be proved as follows: Let b =ob
+(1—o)b,bb,
O<e<1; let b1 be similarly defined. We want to show that Re(b, b÷1) >
eRe(b,b÷1) ÷ (1_e)Re(4, 4+)•Letc7 =c*(b7,b÷1),
4= x(b],b1t+i) be the values of ct, xt chosen at the optimum, given (b,
consider Re(b, b÷1):
Re(b, 4÷)= u(c)+v(4)+h(1-4-4)￿
￿ uIoc-t-(1_e)4J÷v(ex÷(1—e)x)-s- (A.29)
+h(1-o4—(1—0)4 —e4—(1—e)x)
(A.29) follows from the definition of c, 4andfrom the quasi—concavity of
H(.). Moreover, by the strict concavity of u(•), v(.) and h(S), the right
hand side of (A.29) is strictly greater than:
o[u(c)÷v(x)+h(1-c —x)]+(1—e)[u(4)+v(4)-t-h(1—4—4)]
=
(A.30)
=
oRe(b,b1)÷(1_B)Re(b, b÷1)
It follows that Re(.) is strictly concave in both bt and bt+i.
Finally, from the envelope theorem and from the first order conditions
28from which equation (10) in the text is derived we obtain:
aRE (h—u)c
FIb <0 (A.31)
t Ct
aRe e(h _u)
ab
=
R2
=
FIb >0, if FIb >0. (A.32)
t+1 c t+1 ti-i
Q.E.D.
4. Proof of Proposition 4
Equation (26) in the text implicitly defines bt+i as a function of bt and
aB(b ,P)
P: =B(bt.P). We will use the following notation: B1 =
ab
t
a2B(b,P)
B12 =ab
,andso on. We prove stability first. This involves
t
showing that 1B11 <1.By the envelope theorem:
V(bt+i) =R7(b+1,bt+2) (A.33)
Plugging (A.33) in (26) of the text, differentiating with respect to bt and
then setting bt =bt÷i,we obtain:
R1+R2B1÷&PR71B1 +oPR2(Bl)2so(1_P)VbBi
=0 (A.34)
where R? denotes the second derivative of Re with respect to its ith and ,jth
arguments. Solving (A.34) with respect to B, we find that both roots are
positive and real, and that one lies inside and the other outside the unit
circle. Specifically, the stable root is:
(Re +opRe ÷(i P)VN B =- b
(A.35) 1
26PR2
where B =(R2÷• + o(1_P)Vb)2—
4(R2)2&P
>0
29If the second order condition stated in footnote (12) holds, then it can be
shown that the right hand side of (A.35) is always included in the open
interval (0,1). The root inside the unit circle is the solution to the
dynamic programming problem (since Ve(.) is decreasing in bt); thus the steady
state is locally stable.
In order to prove that the steady state debt is positive, note that, with
P =andusing (24) —(25)in the text, we obtain:
V(bt+i) =R(bt+i.bt÷2) +Bi(bt+t)(R(bt+ibt+z) -R(bt+i.bt÷2) (A.36)
Then, substitute (A.33) and (A.36) into (25) of the text and use (11) to
simplify. In the steady state, we obtain:
+ — B1h9g2+
oPh9[g1+81g21
=0 (A.31)
Let us proceed by contradiction and suppose that, the steady state level of
public debt is 0. Equations (A.20) (A.21) together with (A.31) imply that
=
—6R?.Substituting this expression in (A.37) and using (11) of the text
again to simplify, we obtain:
(P-1)(g +B1g)8hg =0 (A.38)
By Proposition 1, if c.1 and c.2 of Lemma 2.1 hold then g +gCO and g <
0.Since B1 c 1, (A.38) then yields a contradiction, unless P=1. A slightly
more elaborate argument (which again makes use of equation (A.38)) also rules
out the possibility of a negative debt in the steady state. Needless to say,
(A.38) is satisfied if and only if P=1, i.e. in the case of the social
planner.
Q.E.D.
5. Proof of Proposition 5
In order to prove this result we first need this preliminary lemma.
30Lema 5.1
0 if￿0and -￿ 0 (c.3)
Proof:
Using (11) and (A.36):
N
N *
= (R2—
R)B12
=
—hgg2B12 (A.39)
Note that B12 is implicitly defined by equation (25) with P replaced by (1-P)
since we are now considering the party out of office, while (25) in the text
was derived assuming D in office (and C is reelected with probability P).
From (26) in the text we then have:
R(bt. bt+i) +o(1_p)ve(b1 +6PV(bt÷i)
=0 (A.40)
Differentiate (A.40) with respect to bt:
Rl+R2Bl+o(1_P)VbBl +6PVbBl
=0 (A.41)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (A.41):
e dB oB1V —v)
R22+6(l_P)Vbb+oPVbb
Differentiating (A.32), we obtain <0and >0.Hence, by the
condition In footnote (12) (with P replaced by (1—P)), the denominator on the
right hand side of (A.42) is negative. As a result, if —<0,then
B12 >0.Moreover, if Hb >0and if c.1 holds, then g >0(see Section
t+1
avN
2 of the Appendix). Equation (A.39) then Implies that <0.
Q.E.D.
We now turn to proove Proposition 5. We want to show that
31= 0and > 0, where MV and MC correspond to the left and right hand
side of (26) in the text, respectively. If this holds and since the slope of
MV is algebraically lower than the slope of MC, the equilibrium level of
public debt then falls if P rises. (See Figure 1 in the text).
The fact that =0follows because, with P = ge(.) is
independent of P. In order to prove that > 0, we differentiate the
right hand side of (25), and we obtain:
aMC N aV(bt+i)
i-F— =_[V(bt÷l)_Vb(bt+l)+(1_P),
I (A.43)
Consider now the first two terms on the right hand side of (A.43). Using
(11), (A.33) and (A.36), they can be rewritten as:
N * *
-
Vb
=
(g1+ 81g2)hg
* * *
(A.44)
By Lema 2.1, if c.1 and c.2 hold, then + g2 C 0 and g1 C0.Since
0< B1 < 1, the right hand side of (A.43) is negative. This, together with
Lemma 5.1 and (A.41), implies that ->0
Q.E.D.
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*We are grateful to Richard Cantor, Daniel Heyan, John Van Huyck, John
Lott, Susan Vitka and to several of our colleagues at Carnegie-Mellon and UCLA
for helpful discussions and comments on a preliminary version of thispaper.
1. There exists a large literature on the politicaleconomy of fiscal
policy. Earlier contributions such as Niskanen (1971), Buchanan—Wagner
(1979), Brennan—Buchanan (1981) and those surveyed by Muller (1979),
Brunner (1979) and Peacock (1979) were based upon the questionable notion
of "fiscal illusion" and voters' irrationality. This assumption can be
easily criticized theoretically; in addition Cameron (1978) shows that
even empirically this assumption does not perform well. More recent
contributions have studied the "size of government" in general equilibrium
models based upon full rationality, for example see Meltzer-Ricbard
(1981), Becker (1985), Lindbeck (1985), Lindbeck—Weibull (1985). These
models are static: thus they do not address the issue of public debt and
of deficits. Cukierman—Meltzer (1986) have recently provided a rational
politico—economic model of public debt. In their model, unlike in ours,
public debt is used for intergenerational transfers, taxes are non—
distortionary, and the median voter theorem applies.
2. Persson-Svensson (1986) have independently developed a model which
captures a similar idea and is a natural companion to ours. Their paper
differs from ours in the following respects: (i) they focus on the
disagreement about the level of public expenditures, whereas we
concentrate on disagreement about its composition. (ii) they consider a
two—period model in which the current government is sure that it will not
be reappointed, while we have a probabilistic change of government and we
study both a two period and an infinite horizon model; (iii) they do not
explicitly consider voting behavior, while we develop a voting equilibrium
compatible with the economic equilibrium; (iv) they consider a small open
economy, thus they assume an exogenously given world interest rate; we
instead consider a closed economy, thus the interest rate is endogenously
determined. The result of the present paper and those of Persson and
Svensson (1986) are briefly compared in the conclusion.
3. Our results generalize to arbitrary values of b0. (See also footnote
337). The.general results are available from the authors; they were
enclosed in an earlier version of this paper.
4. The issue of government debt repudiation has been recently addressed by
Bental—Kantorowicz—Peled (1986), and Grossman—Van Huyck (1986).
5. Throughout the paper we disregard the possibility of 'cooperation" between
the two parties. Presumably both parties could benefit by agreeing to
compromise to a certain constant composition of public spending. This
agreement could be sustained as a sub—game perfect equilibrium by meansof
reputational strategies as described in a different context by Alesina
(1986, 1987).
6.It can be shown that the condition for an upward sloping labor supply
function is:
Uc + ucc(ct -bt)￿ 0
This assumption is adopted for simplicity of exposition. All our results
generalize to the case of a downward sloping labor supply at the optimum
if a very weak sufficient condition is satisfied. This condition is:
((hg_vx)ucc(HcHx) }+tuc(uccHx+'xxHc
+(uc(hg_vx)[uccc(bt_ct)_2ucc]) ￿ ((uc_hg)[vxxx(1_x)_2vxx]).
It can be shown (see Lemma 2.1 in Appendix) that the three terms on the
right hand side are all positive, if the second order conditions of
problem 8 are satisfied. Thus we require that these three termsdominate
the left hand side (which is also positive).
7. If b00, the optimal and the time consistent policies need not be the
same. (See Lucas—Stokey (1983), footnote 2 page 64). The time consistent
policy is to run a surplus (if b0 >0)or a deficit (if b0 <0)until the
condition of zero outstanding debt is reached. The time inconsistency of
the optimal policy can be explained as in Rogers (1986): If b0 * 0, then
the consumers carry a positive (or negative) amount of wealth to
subsequent periods. The elasticity of labor supply is different before
and after consumers have committed to a saving decision. This difference
generates an incentive for the government to "surprise" the private sector
with an unexpected change of tax policy and hence makes the optimal policy
time inconsistent. As it will be apparent in the next sections of the
34paper, our positive results on the deficit bias hold irrespectively of the
value of b0.
8. For simplicity, and with no loss of generality we assume that indifferent
voters vote for party D. We are also assuming that the costs of voting
are zero and everybody votes. Minor changes of notation would allow us to
consider the case in which indifferent voters randomize their ballot or do
not vote.
9. An additional source of uncertainty about electoral results can arise from
an uncertain number of abstensions. If there is uncertainty about the
distribution of the perceived costs of voting by different voters, there
would be uncertainty about electoral results even if the value of
a1were
known for each consumer. On the costs of voting see for example Ledyard
(1984).
10. The condition that MC intersects MV from below can be stated formally as:
R1+ 5(PVb +(1_P)Vb)
c
11.This result has implications for the 'size of government". An increase in
the steady state of debt in general requires an increase in fiscal
revenues to finance higher interest payments. Under very general
conditions, the size of government as measured by the amount of fiscal
revenues is higher in the two-party system than in the social planner
case. Proof of this statement is available from the authors.
12. The condition in the text of Proposition 5 is only sufficient, and could
be weakened at the price of some additional cumbersome computations. This
condition can be interpreted as follows: the requirement that H,.￿0
•"t+ 1
insures that the government does lot decrease its gross cash flows by
issuing one additional unit of public debt——i.e., that
b
>0,The
requirement that Vb_Vb S0is related (but not equivalent) to the
condition that g* be a concave function of bt andbt+i ——sinceif =½
=h(g*(bt,bt+l)).
13. Note that if P jthe steady state level of debt would be different for
the two parties. Namely, if P 'C the level of debt that party 0 would
choose in the steady state and when in office is higher than the
corresponding level for party R. This suggests that if P $one should
35observe a change of direction in the trend of debt whenever a new party is
elected. Presumably, the fluctuations of debt would be bounded between
these two steady states.
14. Since g0>f0 and since from (32):
Dlahff U —
}.......
itfollows that <0if hggg ￿0,and >0if hggg >0and
sufficiently large. In the former case, the government runs a surplus; in
the second one a deficit.
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